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FLOYD E. WESTON dba METAb
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FORMULA TECHNOLOGY, a Nevadc
Corporation,
Defendant and
Appellees.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Petition for Rehearing of a Memorandum Decision filed March 7,
1996.

B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
ZOLL & BRANCH, P.C.
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360
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Telephone: (801) 262-1500
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellees

JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
IAN A. FORREST (6542)
KESLER & RUST
200 Beneficial Life Tower
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CASE NO. 950481-CA
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RESEARCH INSTITUTE and
:
FORMULA TECHNOLOGY, a Nevada :
Corporation,
:

PRIORITY NO. 15
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Defendant and
Appellees.

:
:
:

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule

35(c) of the Utah Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, Appellee is submitting this Petition for Rehearing of
the Memorandum Decision filed on March 7, 1996. This Petition for
Rehearing is made in good faith and not for purposes of delay.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

On or about September 21, 1994, before the Honorable

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, the attorneys for the parties in this case
entered into a voluntary stipulation and settlement agreement,
purportedly resolving the dispute between the parties.

2.

Pursuant

to

the

terms

of

the

stipulation, and

in

accordance with the understanding of the Defendants' counsel at
that time, the Defendants were to pay $7,500.00. The stipulation
and Order were first to have been prepared by Mr. Rust, counsel for
the Plaintiff, and the Defendants were first to have had the
opportunity to sign the stipulation and approve the Order as to
form, pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

3.

Counsel for the Defendants, Mr. Zoll, communicated with

Defendant
conditional

Floyd

Weston

over

the

telephone

regarding

this

stipulation and Mr. Weston, who was not clearly

understood by Mr. Zoll, stated that prior to entering into the
settlement agreement he would need to get the approval of the Board
of Directors of the corporate Defendant.
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4.

Mr. Zoll described the material terms to the agreement to

Mr. Weston at that time.

However, Weston misunderstood Zoll

relative to the conditional October 3, 1994 deadline, and believed
that the stipulation would not be binding until and Order had been
signed by the Judge, pursuant to his prior experience in such
matters, until he had received a copy of the proposed Order and
until the approval of the Board of Directors of the corporate
Defendant, in entering into the agreement, had been received.

5.

The conditional agreement was never reduced to a written

stipulation, and an Order embodying said agreement was never signed
by the Court, in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4-504(3),
Utah code of Judicial Administration, nor was a copy of a proposed
Order approved as to form by Mr. Zoll as Judge Rigtrup had
required.

6.

Inasmuch as the members of the Board of Directors of the

corporate Defendant were out of town at all relevant times, Floyd
Weston was unable to get their approval
agreement.

for the

settlement

As a result, the $7,500.00 amount was not paid to the

Plaintiff by October 3, 1994.
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7.

Appellee never had the opportunity to review the proposed

Order until after the October 3rd deadline.

8.

Mr. Rust claims to have mailed a proposed draft of the

Order to Mr. Zoll on September 22nd, but Mr. Zoll never received
it.

9.

On September 28th, 1994, Judge Rigtrup signed the Order

even though Mr. Zoll did not approve as the Order to form.

10.

On or about November 4, 1994, the Third Judicial District

Court was scheduled to hear the Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate the
Summary Judgment, which hearing was continued until November 18,
1994, due to the fact that the Judge assigned to hear this matter
did not yet have the Court's file.

11.

However, on November 18, 1994, this Court, the Honorable

Judge Hyde presiding, made a ruling, granting the Plaintiff's
Motion without ever affording the Defendants the opportunity for a
hearing on the dispositive Motion, in spite of the Defendants' time
request or for oral argument, made in accordance with Rule
4-501(3)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

4

12.

The Defendant then filed a Motion for Relief from the

Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

13.

On or about February 2, 1995, Judge Hyde ruled to vacate

his ruling of November 18, 1994, and ruled that Judge Rigtrup would
be the proper judge to review the Defendants' 60(b) Motion, and to
rule with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion for Reinstatement of
Summary Judgment, due to the fact that Rigtrup was the presiding
Judge at the time of the September 21, 1994 stipulation.

In

addition, on or about February 8, 1995, Judge Hyde signed an Order
vacating the Summary Judgment, in order that Judge Rigtrup could
make a decision relative to these matters.

14.

On or about February 27, 1995, this matter came before

Judge Rigtrup for oral argument.

The Court, after having the

opportunity to review the procedural history of the case and the
underlying merits of the respective parties' claims, ruled to
enforce the material terms to the stipulation entered into on
September 21, 1994, by allowing Appellee additional time to pay the
$7,500.00.
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ARGUMENT
I. The Order was not valid because Mr. Zoll did not
H
approve it as to formH as required by Judge Rigtrup.

Appellee never had the opportunity to approve as to form the
proposed Order submitted by Appellant before it was signed by Judge
Rigtrup.

According to the Stipulation that was agreed to by the

parties and by the Court, Appellant's counsel, Mr. Rust, was to
prepare a draft of a proposed order for Mr. Zoll's review before
being submitted to the Judge for signature.

However, instead of

delivering a copy to Mr. Zoll, Mr. Rust simply submitted it to the
Court for signature.

Since Mr. Zoll never had the opportunity to

approve as to form the Stipulation, it was not valid as submitted
to Judge Rigtrup.

II.

Appellee never had the opportunity to object
to the Order

The Stipulation and ensuing Order was submitted to the court
in violation of Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
According to Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration,
copies of "orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before
being presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders.

Notice of objections shall be submitted to the
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court and counsel within five days after service."

4-504(2) Code

of Judicial Administration.
In the Memorandum Decision entered on March 7, 1996, the Utah
Court of Appeals ruled that "Weston had ample time to object to the
stipulation and ensuing order." This, however, is not true because
October 3, the day on which Appellee was required to pay Appellant
$7,500.00, came before the expiration of time allowed by law to
object to the Order.
Mr. Zoll had until October 5th to object to the Order which
came after the October 3rd date of performance pursuant to the
Order.

According, to Rule 4-504(2), Mr. Zoll had five days during

which to object to the Order after it was signed by the court.
Judge Rigtrup signed the Order on September 28, 1994.

The Order

required that Appellee pay Appellant $7,500 no later than October
3rd. However, Appellee had at least until October 5, not counting
three additional days of mailing, to object.

Five days from

September 28, 1994 for purposes of filing an objection, with the
additional two days over the weekend, is October 5th.
performance under the Order on October

Since

3rd came before the

expiration of the allowed time to object, Appellee did not have
ample time to object.

Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals

incorrectly ruled that "Weston had ample time" to object because he
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did not have the time allowed by Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial
Administration•

III.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in altering
the terms of the stipulation.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in altering the
terms of the stipulation to allow Appellee additional time to pay
the $7,500 to Appellant.

According to Utah law, the trial court

has broad discretion to set aside a stipulation. In United Factors
v. T.C. Associates, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court held that relief
from stipulations may be granted by the trial court if there is an
equivalent showing necessary to set aside a contract in equity,
such as mistake of law or fact. United Factors v. T.C. Associates,
Inc. , 445 P.2d 766, (Utah 1968).

The Court further ruled that "it

must be stressed that it was within the discretion of the trial
court to determine whether the stipulation should be vacated." Id.
As in United Factors, Judge Rigtrup determined, based on his
own

fact

finding

and

within

his

own

discretion,

that

the

stipulation should be vacated. Judge Rigtrup was well aware of the
inability for Appellees to make a timely objection to the order
because the time for performance came before the expiration of the
time to object to the Order, as outlined above. Judge Rigtrup also
knew that given the unusual circumstances in which the stipulation
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was negotiated created ample opportunity for Appellee Weston to be
mistaken about the terms of the Stipulation.
These mistakes occurred because Mr. Zoll had to communicate
with Weston on a telephone in the jury room.

Mr. Rust had the

benefit of his clients being present in the courtroom while Mr.
Zoll did not.

As a result of the unusual nature of these

proceedings, Weston misunderstood the terms of the Stipulation.
Judge Rigtrup recognized these misunderstandings and referred to
them as "excusable neglect." Judge Rigtrup as the fact finder, had
the best opportunity to determine these facts and set aside the
Stipulation based on principles of equity.
In the Memorandum Decision filed March 7, 1996 by the Utah
Court of Appeals, there is no indication of abuse of discretion by
the trial court with respect to setting aside the stipulation.
Accordingly, the Appellate Court's decision to reverse the trial
court without a showing of an abuse of discretion is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Utah Court of Appeals should grant Appellee's
Petition for Rehearing because the trial court's ruling should not
have been reversed.

The trial court's initial ruling was correct

for the following reasons: (1) Mr. Zoll never had the opportunity
to approve as to form the Order as was originally agreed to; (2)
Appellee did not have ample time to object to the Order because the
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time

for performance

required by the Order came before the

expiration of the time to object; and (3) the trial court did not
abuse its discretionlin altering the terms of the Stipulation.
DATED this

lL

day of March, 1996.

ZOLL AND, BRANCH

B. Ray ZoJ
Attorney for Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, B. Ray Zoll, hereby certify that, JLmailed the
foregoing Petition for Rehearing on this c'
to:
Joseph C. Rust
Kesler & Rust
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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